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Why is there such wide-spread opposition to immigration, although atti-
tudes are generally favorable towards trade? Using concepts from population
ethics, this paper shows that impartial observers oppose unskilled immigra-
tion if they are inequality-averse, base their decisions on national interest,
and have an integrative view of immigration. Moreover, unskilled immigra-
tion makes redistribution more costly, explaining why opposition to unskilled
immigration is more pronounced than to other policies having an adverse im-
pact on income distribution. In this context, the “immigration surplus” does
not measure any eﬃciency gain and is of no direct relevance for attitudes
towards immigration.
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Free immigration of unskilled workers is hardly advocated by anybody. Even most
economists are reluctant to defend this cause. By contrast, economists are almost
unanimous in their support of free trade (Blendon et al., 1997). From the viewpoint
of standard economic theory, this contrast is puzzling since trade liberalization and
immigration both yieldan eﬃciency gain andentail a change in the d istribution of
income.
Bhagwati (1991, p.2) observes that “those who choose free trade proceed from
(utilitarian) criteria of choice that they often abandon for altogether diﬀerent criteria
(e.g. communitarian) that would justify immigration restriction.” This paper argues
that, contrary to Bhagwati’s view, the conundrum can be resolved by appealing to
a common set of criteria that are consistent with the widely observed opposition
towards unskilled immigrants, on the one hand, and the advocacy of free trade and
skilledimmigration, on the other hand . These criteria are: impartiality, national
interest, andan integrative view of immigration. Consid er each of them in turn.
First, an impartial observer takes distributional eﬀects of immigration into ac-
count. Recent surveys of immigration (Borjas, 1995 and1999; LaLond e andTopel,
1997; Razin andSad ka, 1997) emphasize the fact that income transfers from immi-
gration exceedby far the net welfare gain, suggesting that this might be the reason
why the public debate on immigration stresses the distributional consequences rather
than the eﬃciency gains. However, such a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity
is not speciﬁc to migration. It exists also for other, more widely accepted, eco-
nomic policy measures (such as trade liberalization) and is therefore not suﬃcient
to explain the opposition to unskilledimmigration.
Second, the desirability of immigration is evaluated from a perspective of national
interest. This view, which underlies also the standard welfare analysis of trade and
migration, reﬂects a “realistic” position of international relations.1
Third, the integrative view of immigration claims that admitted immigrants
become new members of the host country’s society. The immigration of an unskilled
worker diﬀers from the import of, say, T-shirts which embody low-skill labor services.
Immigrants are people andsocieties are mad e up of people, not of T-shirts. Basic
as this argument may seem, it has not enteredthe stand ardwelfare analysis of
immigration. In particular the idea of an “immigration surplus” (Borjas, 1995) is
basedon the immigrants’ exclusion from the welfare criterion.
1Few observers defend an ethical position from a global perspective. Such a position might
indeed imply the advocacy of the free movement of persons between nations (Findlay, 1982).
1This paper adopts a diﬀerent view of immigration, placing the immigration issue
in the context of the recent debate on population ethics. A community’s decision to
admit a new immigrant is similar to the decision, at the level of a family, to create
a new child. At ﬁrst sight, there is of course a crucial diﬀerence between the two
situations. In contrast to the unborn child, the potential immigrant exists at the
moment the decision is taken. The analogy seems plausible, however, if the reference
community is the nation.2 Akin to parents who value an unborn childless than an
actual child, the current members of a national community do not take into account
the well-being of potential immigrants, whereas admitted immigrants are considered
as full members of the host country’s community.3 Indeed, the sole willingness to
immigrate is not suﬃcient to be recognizedas a member of the community; the
agreement of the community’s current members is also necessary.
The main results of the paper can be summarizedas follows. The next section
analyzes the impact of immigration on generalizedLorenz (GL) curves of resid ents’
income distribution, using a standard two-factor framework with heterogeneous cap-
ital endowments of residents. It is shown in particular that in the case of individual
immigration of an unskilledworker, the post-immigration GL-curve lies below the
pre-immigration GL-curve. Section 3 links these results to a class of inequality-
averse social evaluation functions proposedby Atkinson (1970) andgeneralizedby
Dasgupta et al. (1973). If the desirability of immigration is judged according to its
impact on the income distribution of current residents, inequality-averse observers
are unanimous both in their opposition to unskilled(capital-poor) immigration and
in their favorable attitude to skilled (capital-rich) immigration. In this context, the
“immigration surplus” is irrelevant, as shown in section 4.
These results raise the question whether there exists a redistribution scheme
which wouldallow to compensate those resid ents who lose from immigration. Sec-
tion 5 establishes that any such scheme entails welfare losses if new immigrants are
treated on an equal footing with other residents. Section 6 considers the question
why attitudes towards trade liberalization diﬀer from attitudes toward immigration,
even if the impact on income distribution is similar. This asymmetry in attitudes
2This position neglects the dimension of international justice and can therefore not be the
basis for an ethics of immigration. However, it describes in a realistic way how people living in a
world of nation-states form their opinions when they take an impartial stance. On the diﬃculty of
formulating a consistent ethical view on immigration, see Barry (1992).
3The distinction between potential and actual persons is a central issue in population ethics.
Dasgupta (1993, 1994) argues that potential persons should receive a smaller weight in the social
welfare function than actual persons. Heyd (1992) proposes to take only actual persons into
account.
2can be explained by extending the one-good model to allow for trade (multi-cone
model). Finally, Section 7 shows that an alternative approach to population ethics
basedon axiomatic theory (Blackorby et al., 1995) can also be transposedto the
case of immigration, without altering the principal results of this paper.
2 Immigration and Generalized Lorenz curves
To get a better grasp of the trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity, it is useful to
consider the impact of immigration on the host country’s entire income distribu-
tion. The privilegedtool for such an analysis is the generalizedLorenz (GL) curve
(Shorrocks, 1983), which can be obtainedfrom the ord inary Lorenz curve by multi-
plying cumulatedincome shares (measuredon the y-axis) by mean income. The fact
that a GL curve of a given income distribution lies above the GL curve of another
income distribution is equivalent with the property that the former is preferred to
the latter in terms of any inequality-averse social welfare function (Shorrocks, 1983,
theorem 2), a result which will be taken up in the following sections.4
In order to remain as close as possible to the simple framework used in the clas-
sical analysis of migration (Grubel andScott, 1966; Berry andSoligo, 1969) and
in recent surveys (Borjas, 1999; Lalonde and Topel, 1997), I assume that aggregate
output in the host country is characterizedby a constant-returns-to-scale neoclassi-
cal production function, f, with two factors of production (capital, K,a n dl a b o r ,L)
and with continuous ﬁrst and second-order derivatives. Heterogeneity is introduced
into this model by assuming that capital is distributed unequally among residents,
whereas each individual oﬀers one unit of (raw) labor. One should think of capital
as being deﬁned in a broad sense, including physical and human capital.
The classical distinction between “inﬁnitesimal” (Grubel and Scott, 1966) and
“ﬁnite” migration (Berry andSoligo, 1969) will turn out to be useful below. In
the present setup, where the number of individuals is a discrete variable, the initial
number of residents is assumed to be suﬃciently large so that the arrival of one
immigrant can be considered as an inﬁnitesimal change in population, meaning that
second (or higher) order eﬀects can be neglected.5
4It should be emphasized that the GL dominance criterion is “biased” towards eﬃciency: when
comparing two income distributions, the distribution with a lower mean will never be preferred.
Therefore the results of this paper would also carry over to the alternative (weaker) conditions
discussed by Shorrocks (1983, theorems 3 and 4).
5What means “suﬃciently large”? Consider the Taylor expansion:
f(K,L +1 )− f(K,L)=fL(K,L)+R1,R 1 =( 1 /2)fLL(K, ˜ L), ˜ L ∈ (L,L +1 )
3With perfect competition on factor markets, the income of resident i,h o l di n ga n
amount ki of capital, is given by: yi = fL +kifK,w h e r efL and fK denote marginal
productivities of labor and capital. Assume that a new immigrant arrives with k∗
units of capital. Then the i-th resident’s income changes as follows:6
∆yi ≡ (dyi/dL
∗)=fKLki +fLL +(fKKki +fLK)k
∗ =( 1−ki/¯ k)(1−k
∗/¯ k)fLL, (1)
where fKL,f KK,f LL denote second-order derivatives of f, L∗ is labor oﬀeredby the
new immigrant and ¯ k is the economy’s average capital-labor ratio.
As arguedinitially by Grubel andScott (1966), average income of resid ents
is not aﬀectedby inﬁnitesimal immigration. The impact of immigration on the
residents’ income distribution depends on the quantity of capital (or skill level) the
new immigrant brings with her. An immigrant is labeledcapital-rich (capital-poor)
relative to residents if k∗ > ¯ k (k∗ < ¯ k).
Proposition 1 (inﬁnitesimal immigration). If the new immigrant is capital-
rich (capital-poor) relative to residents, then the post-immigration GL-curve of the
residents’ income distribution lies above (below) the pre-immigration GL-curve.
Proof: see appendix.
Note that the impact of inﬁnitesimal immigration on the GL-curve is identical to
its impact on the Lorenz curve. In the case of ﬁnite immigration (where k∗ denotes
the average capital holdings of new immigrants), this property does not hold since
the average income of residents increases with immigration.
Proposition 2 (ﬁnite immigration). If the new immigrants are capital-rich (cap-
ital-poor) relative to residents, then the post-immigration GL-curve of the residents’
income distribution lies above (crosses from below) the pre-immigration GL-curve.
Proof: see appendix.
where R1 is the Lagrange remainder of the ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion. Relative to the ﬁrst-order
eﬀect of immigration, the Lagrange remainder is equal to:
R1/fL(K,L)=−sK/(2σ˜ L),
where sK is the cost share of capital, and σ the elasticity of substitution between K and L. With
a population of 2 million, sK =( 1 /3), and σ = 1, the expression on the right-hand side is equal to
8.3×10−8, which is smaller than single machine precision (approximately 10−7) in a ﬂoating-point
system. Thus second and higher order eﬀects of a single immigrant can be safely ignored.
6The second equality uses the continuity of second-order derivatives (implying fKL = fLK)
and the following properties of linearly homogeneous production functions: ¯ kfLK + fLL =0a n d
¯ kfKK + fKL =0 .
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Figure 1: Impact of immigration on generalizedLorenz curves
Propositions 1 and2 are illustratedin Figure 1. How they shape an observer’s
attitudes towards migration is the issue of the next section.
3 Attitudes towards immigration
What criteria, or value judgments, underlie the widely observed attitudes favoring
free trad e andskilledimmigration, but opposing unskilledimmigration? They are
assumedto be the following.
Impartiality (IM). The observer takes an impersonal andimpartial stance,
taking the entire income distribution of a given community into account.
National interest (NI). The observer bases her decisions on national interest,
i.e. the pertinent community is her country (or nation).
5Melting pot (MP). The observer considers that admitted immigrants become
full members of the national community andhave equal rights.
The MP criterion refers to a voluntaristic deﬁnition of the nation, according to
which the nation exists by the common will of its members (Gellner, 1983). In
this view, a potential immigrant is admitted as a new member of the nation if the
current members agree. Once admitted, the new immigrant acquires all rights and
obligations of the current members.
Formally, the IM criterion is implementedby assuming that the observer bases
her judgments on a social evaluation function.7 For a population of L residents, this
function is given by W L(y1,...,y L), where yi denotes income of resident i,a n dW L
is continuous, increasing andstrictly S-concave. Strict S-concavity is equivalent to
the requirement that mean-preserving regressive transfers decrease W L (Dasgupta
et al., 1973). Moreover, S-concavity implies symmetry, which reﬂects the anonymity
of the social evaluation criterion (i.e. only the distribution of income matters, not the
identity of individuals). Another useful concept is the equally-distributed-equivalent
income (Atkinson, 1970), which is denoted by υ andd eﬁnedby: W L(υ,...,υ)=
W L(y1,...,y L).
In the context of ﬁxedpopulation, the social evaluation function can be inter-
pretedin (at least) two ways. A ﬁrst interpretation, which can be calledwelfarist,
is that the individual takes the position of a socially concerned and personally dis-
interestedethical observer who supports the principle of equalizing transfers.
A second interpretation refers to Harsanyi’s (1955) argument that individuals
use impartial andimpersonal criteria when making moral value jud gments about the
merits of alternative social situations. Individuals act behind a “veil of ignorance”, as
if they hadan equal probability of taking any person’s position in society. Therefore,
moral value judgments can be treated as a problem of choice under uncertainty and
the individual’s expected utility function can be reinterpreted in this context as a
strictly concave andsymmetric social evaluation function. 8
Turn now to the evaluation of a policy change. If the number of residents re-
mains ﬁxed, the observer will be in favor of the policy change if it increases W L
7This function is often called social welfare function. For recent surveys on this issue, see
Atkinson and Bourguignon (1999), Cowell (1999) and Sen (1997).
8Behind the veil of ignorance, an individual’s expected utility function has the following form:
Ue =( 1 /L)
 L
i=1 ui, where ui is utility of resident i. Going further than Harsanyi (1955) and as-
suming that all residents have identical utility-of-income functions yields: Ue =( 1 /L)
 L
i=1 u(yi).
Strict risk aversion is reﬂected by strict concavity of u. Note that this interpretation of W im-
poses stronger conditions on W than S-concavity since Ue is symmetric and strictly concave (any
symmetric and strictly concave function is S-concave, but the converse does not hold).
6or, equivalently, υ. The evaluation of migration policy is more diﬃcult. According
to the MP criterion, a new immigrant shouldbe includ edin the social evaluation
function once he has settledin the host country. Before his ad mission, however,
a new immigrant is only a potential resident and the NI criterion implies that he
shouldbe ignoredin the social evaluation function.
In order to be operational in the context of migration policy, the social evalu-
ation function shouldtherefore allow to evaluate the situation of current resid ents
independently of the situation of the new immigrant. This amounts to assume that
W can be written as follows:
W
L+1(y1,...,y L,y L+1)= ˜ W[W
L(y1,...,y L),y L+1]. (2)
As shown by Blackorby et al. (1981, Theorem 1), this assumption of separability
implies that W has the following form:9
W
L(y1,...,y L)=G





where G and g are increasing andcontinuous functions and g is strictly concave.
Hence W is symmetric andquasi-concave. Moreover, mean welfare, as measuredby
equally-distributed-equivalent income, υ = g−1[(1/N)
 N
i=1 g(yi)], is unaﬀectedby
replication of population andthus satisﬁes the “symmetry axiom for population”
proposedby Dasgupta et al. (1973). The criterion that the observer uses to jud ge
the desirability of immigration can now be deﬁned.
Admission principle. An observer who bases his policy preferences on the social










i (yi) denotes the income of resident i after (before) the arrival of the new
immigrant.















What are the consequences of this principle for attitudes towards immigration
9For a similar argument justifying additivity of the social welfare function, see Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1973, p. 198).
7policy? Assume that the structure of the economy is as deﬁned in section 2. As
discussed in that section, the arrival of an individual immigrant does not aﬀect the
average income of residents, and his impact on the Lorenz curve of the residents’
income distribution is described by Proposition 1. Atkinson’s (1970) theorem pro-
vides the link between this proposition and the admission condition (4). According
to Atkinson’s theorem, any social evaluation function of the form (3) leads to the
acceptance of a new immigrant if andonly if the post-immigration Lorenz curve
of the residents’ income distribution dominates the pre-immigration Lorenz curve.
This establishes the following proposition:
Proposition 3. In the absence of redistribution, observers who base their judgments
on a social evaluation function of the form (3) are unanimously in favor of (opposed
to) the arrival of a new immigrant if and only if the immigrant’s human and physical
capital, k∗, is greater (smaller) than the current residents’ average capital stock, ¯ k.
It should be emphasized that the admission principle is individual. The observer
will not be in favor of the admission of an entire group of immigrants on the sole
basis that the average capital-labor ratio of the group is greater than ¯ k.I t w o u l d
always be preferable not to admit those members whose capital holdings are smaller
than ¯ k. Note, however, that the individual admission procedure based on the rule
given in Proposition 3 is not unambiguous when there is an arbitrary (ﬁnite) number
of potential immigrants. Indeed, the sequence of admission decisions matters in this
case.10 The ambiguity can be removedby requiring that, among a group of potential
immigrants, only those individuals who would not be rejected in any of the possible
admission sequences are allowed to enter the country. This amounts to consider the
admission of immigrants by descending order of capital holdings (or skill), excluding
thereby some potential immigrants whose capital holdings are close, but superior,
to the average capital-labor ratio of the initial residents.
Note that there are obvious links between the results of this section andthe
literature on the political economy of immigration, where people’s choices are based
on their personal interest. In particular, Proposition 3 recalls Benhabib’s (1996)
10To see this, consider the following example. There are two homogeneous groups of potential




2 > ¯ k. Assume furthermore that the
average capital-labor ratio of the initial residents and the ﬁrst group of potential immigrants, taken
together, exceeds k∗
2. Then it is clear that if all potential immigrants of group 1 are considered for
admission ﬁrst, no immigrant of group 2 will be admitted subsequently. By contrast, all members
of group 2 would be admitted if they were considered ﬁrst. As this example makes clear, the
ambiguity concerns only potential immigrants whose capital holdings are close, but superior, to
the average capital-labor ratio of the initial residents.
8result that a policy of minimum skill (or capital) requirements defeats all other
policies in a direct democracy framework.
4 The irrelevance of the “immigration surplus”
From the standpoint of the L initial residents, the arrival of a group of L∗ immi-
grants creates a gain, which has been called“immigration surplus” by Borjas (1995).
Figure 2 illustrates the case where immigrants do not bring any capital with them
andwhere the immigration surplus is given by the triangle S. The gain stems
from the fact that all new immigrants are paidthe marginal prod uctivity of the
last immigrant hired; thus the diﬀerence between marginal productivity of the other
immigrants andthe wage rate is reapedby d omestic capital owners. Note that the
source of this eﬃciency gain is the variation in factor prices. In particular, the wage
decreases from w to w  with immigration, leading to a redistribution, among initial
residents, of the area R from workers to capital owners.11
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Figure 2: The vanishing immigration surplus
In the individual admission procedure discussed above, L∗ is negligibly small
relative to L. Thus the second-order eﬃciency gain S vanishes, whereas the ﬁrst-
order redistribution eﬀect R explains the negative attitude towards capital-poor
11In the model of the preceding sections, residents are both workers and capital owners. In that
context, the area R can be interpreted as the revenue from a poll tax on individuals, which is
redistributed proportionally to capital holdings.
9immigration. By contrast, the immigration surplus plays a role in the case of group-
wise (ﬁnite) immigration of capital-poor workers. Proposition 2 establishes that
in this case the pre- andpost-immigration GL-curves cross. Hence, by Shorrocks’
(1983) theorem 2, one cannot expect unanimity on the desirability of this type of
immigration among observers using social evaluation functions of the form (3).
If the immigration surplus is of any relevance in the context of migration policy,
then an observer characterizedby a low d egree of inequality-aversion 12 wouldgive
the eﬃciency gain more weight than the redistribution eﬀect, and would thus be in
favor of capital-poor immigration. In fact, this argument does not hold if immigrants
become full residents once they are admitted. To see this, assume the observer
considers the admission of L∗ identical immigrants holding no capital, as illustrated
in Figure 2. It wouldclearly be preferable to ad mit only the L∗−1 ﬁrst immigrants
since Proposition 3 shows that the last immigrant, taken individually, should not be
accepted. But then, of course, the next-to-last immigrant should not be admitted
either and, by backward induction, all other potential immigrants should be rejected.
Thus an integrative view of immigration leads to the conclusion that, as an
aggregate welfare measure, the immigration surplus is not only subject to similar
criticisms as the consumer surplus13 but is even more fundamentally ﬂawed because
it neglects the problem of varying population size. The area S shouldnot be inter-
pretedas a surplus or an eﬃciency gain, but rather as a red istribution of income
from the ﬁrst-arrivedimmigrants to native capital owners.
5 The cost of compensating redistribution
The preceding sections established that, in view of the missing eﬃciency gain, im-
partial observers unanimously oppose capital-poor immigration because of its detri-
mental distributional eﬀects. Could the latter be compensated by an appropriate
redistribution policy?
According to the MP principle, ﬁscal discrimination against immigrants is ruled
out. Assume furthermore that individuals diﬀer only in their holdings of capital.
In this context, a redistribution scheme which consists in taxing capital income (at
rate t) andpaying a basic income b to every resident is quite general, since with
ﬁxedpopulation it is able to generate complete income equality among resid ents.
12In a social evaluation function of the form (3), (relative) inequality-aversion can be measured
by µ(y)=−yg  (y)/g (y). Even though µ(y) > 0 for all y>0 (due to the assumption that g is
increasing and strictly concave), it can be set arbitrarily close to zero.
13See Slesnick (1998) who advocates the use of social welfare functions in order to account for
heterogeneity among households.
10Moreover, this redistribution scheme does not create any distortions in the present
model since factor supplies are ﬁxed.
Before immigration, resident i’s income is yi = fL +( 1− t)kifK + b andthe
government’s budget constraint is bL = tKfK. Now consider the arrival of a new
immigrant, bringing k∗ units of capital with him, andd enote post-immigration vari-
ables by a prime ( ). The government’s budget constraint is changed to: b (L+1)=
t (K + k∗)f 
K,w h e r ef 
K = fK(K + k∗,L+ 1). Aggregate income of the L pre-

















since with individual immigration, fL
 L + fK
 K = fLL + fKK =
 L
i=1 yi.T h u s ,i f
the new immigrant has the characteristics of a net beneﬁciary of the redistribution
system (i.e. if he is capital-poor), his arrival entails an ex-ante loss for current
residents. Indeed, at the time the admission decision is taken, the new immigrant is
only considered a potential resident whose welfare does not matter in the decision
whether to admit him. This result leads to the following proposition.14
Proposition 4. Under the conditions of Proposition 3, capital-poor immigration
(k  < ¯ k) combined with distortion-free redistribution is unable to achieve an income
distribution for current residents that observers would unanimously prefer to the
pre-immigration situation.
Proof: see appendix.
There is an interesting link between Proposition 4 andthe “immigration surplus”.
Consider again the case of immigrants without capital, as depicted in Figure 2, and
assume that the host country implements a redistribution scheme which aims at
compensating entirely the fall in the wage rate due to immigration. Consistent
application of such a scheme implies that the successive arrival of L∗ immigrants
produces a loss equal to the triangle D.15 If the marginal-labor-productivity schedule
is approximately linear on the interval (L,L+L∗), then the loss D is approximately
identical to the area S.
14Note that equation (6) and Proposition 4 can be considered as the “dual” of the results obtained
by Wildasin (1994) and Razin and Sadka (1995, 1997) who demonstrate that redistribution has a
cost if there is free movement of persons.
15The redistribution scheme consists in adjusting basic income b upwards at each arrival of an
immigrant. As the new immigrant does not hold any capital, his net gain from redistribution is b,
which is equal to the diﬀerence between the initial wage rate, w, and marginal labor productivity.
According to equation (6), the net gains of potential immigrants represent a loss for current
residents, adding up to D for L∗ new immigrants.
11This leads to a heretic reinterpretation of the “immigration surplus” in the con-
text of capital-poor immigration: rather than measuring an eﬃciency gain for the
host country, it mirrors the aggregate costs of immigration in a context where the
government protects the poorest workers against income loss. Note that this rein-
terpretation is more in line with the popular perception that if immigration leads
to large wage decreases — a necessary condition for a large immigration surplus —
this represents a cost rather than a beneﬁt.
6 The non-equivalence of trade and migration
Why are attitudes towards trade so diﬀerent from attitudes towards migration, albeit
trade might aﬀect the distribution of income in similar ways as migration? To carry
out an explicit comparison of the eﬀects of trade and migration, the one-sector two-
factor model used so far is extended to a multi-sector framework, allowing for trade:
the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) multi-cone model (with n>2 goods). In contrast to
the original HO-model, this model has the desirable feature that the factor-price-
equalization property does not hold if factor endowments are suﬃciently diﬀerent
from one country to the other. As a consequence, free trade does not eliminate the
incentive to migrate.
Consider now a small country which is confronted with given world prices. It
is highly unlikely that the country produces more than two goods. Depending on
factor endowments, production is diversiﬁed (two goods are produced), or not (only
one good is produced). In the former case, the country’s factor endowment is in a
diversiﬁcation cone and inﬁnitesimal migration has no eﬀect on factor prices. This
can be illustrated in a Lerner-Pearce diagram (see Figure 3, depicting unit-value
isoquants for n = 3 goods). Assume that the initial capital-labor ratio of the
country (¯ k0) lies inside diversiﬁcation cone D1 where goods X and Y are produced.
The arrival of capital-poor immigrants diminishes the average capital-labor ratio
of the economy, ¯ k, but does not aﬀect factor prices, and thus income distribution,
until ¯ k reaches the limit of diversiﬁcation cone D1,a t¯ kc. At that point, the country
specializes in production of good Y andfurther migration will have the same eﬀects
as in the one-sector model of the preceding sections.
From these considerations it is clear that residents are indiﬀerent to capital-poor
immigration up to some critical level (deﬁned implicitly by ¯ k = ¯ kc) andthat they
are opposedto any further immigration, as the country’s end owment vector enters














Figure 3: Diversiﬁcation cones andimmigration
of capital-rich immigration is favored.
Now turn to the eﬀects of trade liberalization. Assume that in the initial diver-
siﬁedequilibrium, the labor-intensive goodis protectedby a tariﬀ. Red ucing this
tariﬀ increases average income but, as straightforwardapplication of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem shows, reinforces income inequality. Hence, at ﬁrst sight, the
eﬀect of trade liberalization on the GL-curve is similar to the impact of ﬁnite capital-
poor immigration. There are, however, two important diﬀerences between the two
cases. First, trade liberalization entails a genuine eﬃciency gain, by contrast to
immigration. Second, there are no barriers to redistribution associated with trade
liberalization. On the one hand, the redistribution scheme discussed in the pre-
ceding section is feasible without cost. On the other hand, a combination of spe-
ciﬁc taxes/subsidies on the consumption of goods and on the use of factors can be
designed, such that the post-liberalization income distribution is identical to the
pre-liberalization situation.16
It appears therefore that an impartial andinequality-averse observer is likely to
support free trad e andcapital-rich immigration, andto oppose capital-poor immi-
gration, while being in favor of income redistribution.17
16Dixit and Norman (1980) show that this tax scheme is feasible since it leads to a nonnegative
net tax revenue. Wong (1995, theorem 8.4) generalizes their results to a situation including tariﬀs.
17With the redistribution scheme of Section 5, the optimal policy, from the point of view of the
impartial observer, would obviously be to redistribute all capital income, such as to achieve an
egalitarian distribution of income. Such an extreme outcome can be prevented by dropping the
137 Critical-value utilitarianism and immigration
The results of this paper hinge upon the assumption that the situation of a poten-
tial immigrant is not taken into account when current residents decide whether to
admit him. This assumption, which is a special case of the criterion proposed by
Dasgupta (1993, 1994) in the context of population ethics, has been criticizedby
Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) because it does not generate a single ordering of
social preferences. These authors propose an axiomatic approach to the population
problem, which is developed further in Blackorby et al. (1995). They show that
an ordering satisfying the axioms of anonymity, continuity, strong Pareto, and in-
dependence of the utilities of the dead18 can be representedby the following social




[h(ui) − h(α)], (7)
where ui are individual utilities, and h is continuous andincreasing, with h(0) = 0.
Because of the presence of a critical level α, the authors call this approach critical-
level generalizedutilitarianism.
Inequality aversion can be introduced by assuming that h is strictly concave.
Furthermore, assume for simplicity that individual utilities are given by individual
incomes (ui ≡ yi).19 The social evaluation function (7) can now be usedto evaluate
the desirability of immigration. The impact of a new immigrant’s arrival on this
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The ﬁrst term on the right handsid e of equation (8) measures the impact of immi-
gration on the L current residents, whereas the second represents the social valuation
of the additional immigrant. If the qualitative impact of immigration on the two
terms coincid es, then critical-level generalizedutilitarianism andthe approach used
in the preceding sections have identical implications for attitudes towards migration.
assumption that redistribution can be carried out without cost.
18The strong Pareto condition says that the ordering is based on individual utilities. “Indepen-
dence of the utilities of the dead” requires that, if in two alternative situations the same individuals
are born and die before the current period, the ranking of the two alternatives does not change if
these individuals are removed from the alternatives in question.
19Assuming that ui are identical concave utility-of-income functions would not change the qual-
itative results discussed below.
14Proposition 5. Assume that the desirability of an additional immigrant is evalu-
ated using critical-level generalized utilitarianism. Then this approach leads to the
admission principle (4) if, and only if, α =¯ y.
Proof: see appendix.
From the viewpoint of an impartial observer, the choice α =¯ y is rather unap-
pealing, since replication of the population wouldthen leadto a d ecrease in WB.
Neutrality of the social evaluation criterion with respect to replication of the pop-
ulation is obtainedwhen α = υ<¯ y. The observer might also choose to set α at
a lower level. To illustrate the consequences of such a choice, consider the special
case where immigrants do not bring any capital with them, and assume that α is
set at the level of the current wage rate, w. Then immigration will be unanimously
opposedby observers, since both terms in (8) are negative or zero.
What about the “immigration surplus” in this context? If inequality-aversion
is zero (h(y)=y), the arrival of L∗ new immigrants creates a loss equal to D in
ﬁgure 2. Note that even distortion-free redistribution cannot eliminate this loss.
Alternatively, if α is set equal to w ,t h eL∗ new immigrants create a social gain
equal to S. This suggests that S can only be interpretedas a “surplus” as long as
immigration does not imply that the immigrants’ income falls below α. When this is
the case, the “surplus” turns into a loss andfurther immigration will be opposed . 20
The main result, which is consistent with the approach adopted in the preceding
sections, can thus be statedas follows. Observers are unanimously in favor of free
skilledimmigration. Moreover, all observers oppose unskilledimmigration beyond
a certain level. By contrast to the other approach, however, observers whose social
preferences are characterizedby a low α are in favor of limitedunskilledimmigration.
8 Conclusions
This paper gives explicit criteria, or value judgments, that are compatible with
widely observed attitudes towards immigration. The decision to admit immigrants
is interpreted, from the perspective of a nation, as a choice involving diﬀerent num-
bers of people. Two diﬀerent approaches, adapted from the literature on population
ethics, leadto the result that impartial observers unanimously oppose (unlimited )
20An important diﬀerence between the two cases should, however, be emphasized. By contrast to
the case α = w, where immigration is unanimously opposed by observers, there is no such unanimity
about the desirability of L∗ immigrants if α = w , since from the viewpoint of inequality-averse
observers the surplus S might be compensated by the increase in inequality.
15unskilledimmigration, but are in favor of free skilledimmigration. The compar-
atively greater opposition to unskilledimmigration than to other policy measures
having an adverse impact on income distribution (e.g. trade liberalization) can be
explainedby two factors. First, if new immigrants become full members of the host
nation, there is no eﬃciency gain from immigration. Second, a potential immigrant
makes redistribution costly if he is a net beneﬁciary of income transfers. In this
context, the “immigration surplus” does not measure any eﬃciency gain. On the
contrary, in the case of unskilledimmigration, it is approximately equal to the cost
of compensating redistribution for current residents.
It shouldbe emphasizedthat the three criteria proposedin this paper are as-
sumed to give a realistic description of actual attitudes in many countries, not to
serve as ingredients of a consistent ethical position on migration. In particular,
migration ethics cannot be basedon the national interest alone. Moreover, many
important social andcultural factors have been omittedfrom the analysis. Never-
theless, making value judgments explicit helps to clarify the immigration debate. It
is somehow paradoxical that an integrative view of immigration leads to unanimous
opposition to unskilledimmigrants. It is, of course, the combination with the cri-
teria of national interest andof impartiality that lead s to this result. This suggests
that it might be interesting to examine the implications of departures from these
criteria. For example, in a “guest-worker” system people do not have an integrative,
but an exclusive, view of immigration, making it more likely for unskilledimmi-
gration to be generally accepted. On the other hand, the perception of national
interest can evolve. In many European countries, the reference community for im-
migration decisions tends to become the European Union, and the attention focuses
on immigration from outside the EU.
16Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider ﬁrst capital-rich immigration (k∗ > ¯ k). From
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i=1 ∆yi > 0, andthus
  
i=1(yi +∆ yi) >
  
i=1 yi, for all   =
1,...,L− 1. This is equivalent to saying that the post-immigration GL-curve lies
above the pre-immigration GL-curve.
For capital-poor immigration, all inequalities are simply reversed.
Proof of Proposition 2. To analyze ﬁnite immigration, consider (1) with L∗ > 0.
Then ¯ k =(
 L
i=1 ki + k∗L∗)/(L + L∗) can be interpretedas a weightedaverage of
 L
i=1 ki/L and k∗. Therefore, (¯ k −
 L
i=1 ki/L)a n d( ¯ k −k∗) are of opposite sign, and
summing (1) over i thus yields
L  
i=1
∆yi > 0. (A.2)
Now assume k∗ > ¯ k. From (A.1) and(A.2) it is clear that
  
i=1 ∆yi > 0,
  =1 ,...,L. Hence the post-immigration GL-curve lies above the pre-immigration
GL-curve.
By contrast, if k∗ < ¯ k, it is clear from (A.1) that the post-immigration GL-curve
lies below the pre-immigration GL-curve at low incomes. On the other hand, (A.2)
shows that the opposite holds for the highest incomes. Thus the post-immigration
GL-curve crosses the pre-immigration GL-curve from below.
Proof of Proposition 4. From Proposition 2, it is clear that without redistri-
bution, the post-immigration GL-curve lies below the pre-immigration GL-curve.
According to Shorrocks’ (1983) theorem 2, this is equivalent with unanimous oppo-
sition to immigration.
With redistribution (t>0), equation (6) implies that the current residents’
average income decreases with immigration. Thus the post-immigration GL-curve
lies below the pre-immigration GL-curve at least for the richest resident.
Proof of Proposition 5. The ﬁrst term on the right handsid e of equation (8) is
equal to N[g(υ )−g(υ)], where υ  is deﬁned by (5). This expression is positive if, and
only if, the admission condition (4) is satisﬁed. Now turn to the link between the
ﬁrst andthe secondterm in (8). The following equivalences follow from proposition 3
andthe d eﬁnition of income: υ  >υ ↔ kN+1 > ¯ k ↔ y 
N+1 > ¯ y. Therefore, as g
is increasing, N[g(υ )−g(υ)] and[ g(y 
N+1)−g(α)] have the same sign if andonly if
α =¯ y.
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